Iman Rahim Nasirian; Abdurrazzaq Hesamifar; Seyyed Masoud Seyf; Mohammad Hassan Heydari
Abstract
The argument between Habermas and Rorty is directed toward organizing justification relations based on the Truth. Both of them suggest a pragmatic turn to avoid Truth deadlocks of the ...
Read More
The argument between Habermas and Rorty is directed toward organizing justification relations based on the Truth. Both of them suggest a pragmatic turn to avoid Truth deadlocks of the epistemological approach. Their difference of opinion is formed from the fact that Rorty takes the pragmatic turn to the extent that eliminates the concept of Truth, but Habermas considers a Kantian meaning for Truth, according to which Truth is merely a regulative and transcendental idea that assuming its existence is necessary for the possibility of organizing justification relations of actors. Rorty, on the other hand, believes that Truth even in its regulative and transcendental sense, does not offer any useful meaning. Because nothing can be targeted and achieved unless it is recognizable how to gain it or how to get an approach to it. The criterion that Rorty offers to organize justification relations is not a Truth in the future, but a narrative of the experiences we have had. It seems that Rorty is successful in rejecting Habermas' criticisms against the possibility of eliminating the concept of Truth in organizing justification relations; in the sense that his thought is more compatible with a pragmatic turn. But Rorty's alternative for Truth also implies that no specific goal virtually is conceivable for the human being. The worthiness of narratives in organizing the relations of actors is recognizable only in the realm of experience. According to him, we should only hope to follow a better path than the previous one. This ambiguity in Rorty's thought is perhaps the most important challenge in accepting his views.
